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Psychiatry is moving through a period in which its basic subject matter — namely, the experiential world of its 
patients — seems inaccessible and unknowable. (Schwartz and Wiggins  2004)  
 
The crucial issue is whether psychiatric syndromes are separated from one another, and from normality, by 
zones of rarity or whether they are merely arbitrary loci in a multidimensional space in which variation in both 
symptoms and etiology is more or less continuous. (Kendell and Jablensky  2003)  
 
 
A conversation and reciprocal osmosis between philosophy and psychology have thus far 
been, with periodically varying intensities, maintained for well over a century. 
Correspondingly, we rather frequently find such themes as the nature and acquisition of 
language, epistemology, identity, the structure of personality, culture, and distress in all its 
manifestations being discussed with about the same verve and conviction by members of 
both camps. Indeed, since the latter half of the nineteenth century, world scholarship has 
included theoretical models, or parts thereof, within which the boundaries between these 
disciplines are so obscure as to be practically nonexistent. For example, insofar as Sigmund 
Freud’s psychoanalytic ideas of totem and taboo, the Oedipus and the Electra complexes, 
thanatos, and his elegantly interlocking mechanistic structural schema of id, ego, and 
superego are all epiphenomenal, his personality model might be thought of as more 
properly belonging within the perimeters of metaphysics than within our current, 
experiment- and statistics-obsessed psychology. Much the same (and perhaps framed in 
stronger terms) might be said concerning Carl Gustav Jung’s indelible anthropological 
inclinations in his analytical psychology, and particularly about his focus on mythology and 
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dreams, and his notion of the collective unconscious, including archetypes, the shadow, and 
the anima and the animus.  
  
Nor are psychodynamic paradigms the only result of this mingling of philosophy and 
psychology: Presuming students of intellectual history are right, the incunabula of 
experimental psychology — no less a hard science than chemistry or physics — can be 
traced back to the first psychological laboratory, established by Wilhelm Wundt, who was 
certain that his research equally enriched both philosophy and psychology. In view of these 
observations, one would be right to infer that the widening divergence between the two 
fields must have begun relatively recently.  
         
Freud’s decisive impression upon psychiatry’s developmental trajectory during the former 
half of the twentieth century precipitated another consequential interdisciplinary mingling, 
this one between psychiatry and philosophy. In fact, Ludwig Binswanger’s existential 
approach to phenomena, intentionality, and his preoccupation with freedom, guilt, anxiety, 
and death, along with Karl Jaspers’ phenomenological and existential treatment of Dasein, 
Existenz, Transcendence, and his pointed concern with delusions, represent perhaps the 
most illustrative amalgams of philosophy and psychiatry. Yet, within a few years following 
World War II, when many were beginning to believe that these and thematically parallel 
syntheses were setting the foundations of an exciting new scholarship, the hairline fissures 
which always existed between the biological and the psychodynamic camps in psychiatry 
suddenly became increasingly wider. The ensuant climate of division and uncertainty, in 
turn, created an opportunity for some to challenge not only the propriety of coercive 
treatment of the mentally ill, but also the very use of neuroleptic drugs, psychiatry’s medical 
provenance notwithstanding. Ironically, and still worse, some of those challengers were 
themselves — psychiatrists.  
 
While between the early 1960s and mid-1980s this new, antipsychiatry movement 
comprised texts from much of the world, those of its founders were the most frequently 
quoted and remained as striking as they were initially: Reinforcing his first salvo fired in an 
earlier paper, Thomas Szasz claimed that modern psychiatry began not by identifying 
“diseases by means of established methods of pathology, but by creating a new criterion of 
what constitutes disease” (1961/1974: 12). As such, Szasz urged, it should be in no sense a 
hyperbole to say that mental illness is, fundamentally, a myth (xv). At about the same time, 
underscoring the thesis that mental illness is not quite what we have been led to believe, 
R.D. Laing maintained that a schizophrenic’s actions “can be seen in at least two ways . . . 
as ‘signs’ of a disease . . . [or] as expressive of his existence” (1960/1969: 31). Hence, 
Laing counseled, we should be closer to the truth to regard what most of us would call 
behavioral symptoms as mere reflections of one’s interpretation of his or her cultural 
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environment. Lastly, locating mental illness within social hierarchies of power relations, 
Michel Foucault observed that the modern day mental institution, much as did the asylum 
centuries ago, marks “the boundary of reason and unreason” and “enjoy[s] a double power: 
over the violence of fury in order to contain it, and over reason itself to hold it at a distance” 
(1961/1988: 245). In that respect, Foucault noted, our mental health system might not 
improperly be said to be preoccupied with incarcerating anyone whom most of society tends 
to consider an Other, as did many European societies with lepers until leprosy’s virtual 
extinction at the end of the Middle Ages.  
 
Jarred by these and similarly substantial objections, psychiatry embarked upon a continuing 
course of self-amelioration. Consequently, with the proscription of leucotomy and the de-
institutionalization of large state-supported mental hospitals in the late 1960s; with today’s 
much lower incidence of involuntary commitment; the invention of atypical or second 
generation antipsychotic drugs, which have reduced the potential for, and the effects of, 
tardive dyskinesia; and with the invention of neuroimaging instruments, which reveal the 
influence of neurotransmitters upon brain processes — psychiatry showed that it had 
developed into a science with conscience.  
            
Insufficient as these revisions turned out to be in neutralizing antipsychiatry as a movement, 
they nevertheless contributed toward marginalizing its leaders, and therewith dissipating 
much of its influence. (Granted, Foucault’s voice remains relatively strong in certain 
philosophical circles, but that is because of his contribution to cultural genealogy and to the 
history of ideas, not because of his advocacy of antipsychiatry.) In fact, since the mid-
1980s, antipsychiatry has been unable to cogently point to any sway outside the two spheres 
wherein it has consistently found sympathizers, namely, the mental health 
consumer/survivor movement — run largely by former patients whose diagnoses and 
treatment made them feel dehumanized — and the Church of Scientology. To the extent, 
however, that antipsychiatry virtually sprang into being as, fundamentally, an academic 
front, many of even these sympathizers have trained a less than trustful eye on its claims 
and intentions. The teleological discrepancy between these ideological parallels is also 
reflected in the public’s general perception of them: While antipsychiatry’s challenge of 
psychiatry has appeared to most of those familiar with it as intramural esotericism, the 
consumer/survivors’ and the Scientologists’ radicalism seems to most of those familiar with 
the salubrious results of psychiatric treatment, frightening. And reasonably so, for 
consumer/survivors and Scientologists have as their objective not to in any recognizable 
sense improve the mental health system, but to deracinate it.  
 
Only partly impressed by psychiatry’s list of self-corrections, since abut the end of the 
twentieth century, a growing host of writers have dusted off and restructured some of 
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antipsychiarty’s questions and perspectives under the name of a new investigative field, the 
philosophy of psychiatry. Nor should the alacrity wherewith this new scholarship has 
installed itself as a seminal section of the philosophy of mind really surprise us, as the 
academic climate — and to a large degree the cultural climate — essential for its quick 
acceptance had been already prepared by postmodernism’s rejection of totalizing models 
and advocacy of semiotic analysis. Whether, then, stimulated by the opportunity to bring 
into existence still more conceptual amalgams, or raise doubt about, decenter, or sublate 
prevailing theories and practices, the new field’s contributors have discovered another, 
younger generation of receptive ears. While some of these contributors have aimed at 
presenting an objective appraisal of psychiatry’s reductive, diagnostic, and therapeutic 
triumphs, others have concentrated on the ethical implications that attach to the idea of 
mental illness, and still others attempted to create a mutually illuminating relationship 
between psychiatry and philosophy. Jennifer Radden, for one, puts these conceptual nodes 
and chiasmata into focus as follows:  
 
Clinical practice, psychiatric theorizing and research, mental health policy, and the 
economics and politics of mental health care each ineluctably engage philosophical 
ideas. Disease, health, and disability are moral and metaphysical categories as much 
as they are social and legal descriptions. Conceptions of rationality, personhood, and 
autonomy, the preeminent philosophical ideas and ideals grounding modern-day 
liberal and humanistic societies such as ours, also frame our understanding of mental 
disorder and rationales for its social, clinical, and legal treatment. (2004: 3)               
 
Besides reaffirming these nexuses between philosophy and psychiatry, Radden is at once 
identifying what she believes is a persistent need for, and promoting precisely that type of a 
symbiotic approach to mental health care; and, at least in principle, rightly so, since while 
philosophy can explicate psychiatry’s “moral and metaphysical categories” from a 
conceptually complementary angle, and ipso facto further sharpen psychiatry’s analysis and 
application, psychiatry can expand philosophy’s understanding of reason, irrationality, and 
human nature. In practice, though, this relationship might (not unfairly) be characterized as 
somewhat one-sided, for philosophy has much more to gain from psychiatry than psychiatry 
could ever gain from philosophy.  
 
Radden’s same textual passages might also be interpreted as implicitly providing 
justifications for any attempt to establish philosophy as an authority to which psychiatry 
would be wise to appeal and defer when considering questions of ethics. It is, of course, true 
that disease, health, and disability are moral and metaphysical categories, and that 
“rationality, personhood, and autonomy” are seminal philosophical conceptions. It is at the 
same time equally true that these and related themes, taken together, were already an 
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important constituent of the theoretical and therapeutic frameworks of psychodynamic and 
existential clinicians decades before the appearance of even the first philosopher of 
psychiatry. Accordingly, Radden’s counsel would have served us better had it said that 
philosophers and mental health practitioners should borrow from each other’s findings, 
instead of intimating that we all might benefit from the addition of another stratum of 
control over the existing regulating homunculus that is psychiatry’s conscience.  
 
Perhaps, one might retort dubiously, perhaps it would be excessive to claim that 
psychiatry’s conscience is in need of reinforcement. Even so, is it not the case that some of 
antipsychiatry’s objections remain relevant? Do not, for example, questions about the 
influence of values in the treatment of mental illness, and about psychiatry’s legal power, 
which has always been greater than its partly unscientific precepts should merit, continue to 
be largely undervalued? Still more, might we unqualifiedly dismiss the Szasz-inspired idea 
that while psychiatrists and physicians resort to similar therapeutic methodologies, insofar 
as they are engaged in different types of patient evaluation they ought to be seen as 
practicing different professions? After all, unlike physical illnesses, whose diagnoses rest on 
empirical, structural-functional evidence, mental disorders are diagnosed under the 
influence of such ethical and religious and philosophical questions as, “How does man live? 
and, How ought man to live?”  
 
“Psychologists and psychiatrists,” according to Szasz, “deal with moral problems which . . . 
they cannot solve by medical methods” (1961/1974: 9). Underscoring this notion’s bottom 
line, Szasz insists that insofar as they are influenced by personal and cultural norms and 
values, all psychiatric evaluations and treatment must be pronounced biased, and thus 
scientifically and ontologically tenuous. Upon reflection, however, this claim begins rapidly 
to yield much of its superficial élan: We can, indeed, point to no human-independent 
standards that might be said to inform any therapist’s decisions; or, as David Hume puts it 
in his Treatise of Human Nature:  
  
[C]an there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, 
whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow’d to be vicious: 
Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that 
matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, 
you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other 
matter of fact in the case.  (Book III, Part I, Section 1)    
 
Yet, questions about whether we actually require intrinsic standards whereby we might 
justify psychiatric diagnoses, or whether all standards qua values are of equal weight, are 
infrequently addressed by Szasz or by his backers. To illustrate, if personal values really 
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reflect what we think of as important to us, then one’s impulse toward, and engagement in, 
behaviors that include, say, a full spectrum of devious sexual play, or uncontrolled 
pyromania, and, yes, even infanticide would have to be declared no less legitimate — when 
viewed, let us emphasize, from a moral, if not a legal, vantage point — than are preferences 
for, say, specific foods or drink or clothes.  
 
It is, possibly, because of this absence of intrinsic criteria that human beings have evolved a 
moral consciousness, or synderesis, as the Scholastics taught, which reveals and directs us 
to the types of values we ought to adopt and nurture or reject and punish for the purpose of 
cultural as well as personal self-preservation. It is precisely because from an early age we 
recognize the drives and actions which tend to be injurious to our fellow citizens, that any 
one would practically invariably meet with dark-browed stares — from antipsychiatrists, 
ethical relativists, and anarchists as well as from the general public — upon conceding that 
he or she is actively pursuing any of the values in the first group. But if, as I say, 
antipsychiatrists themselves would readily base their disapproval of these behaviors on the 
widespread grasp of right and wrong — what could possibly arouse their suspicion 
concerning any qualified therapist’s seemingly impartial diagnosis of what obviously passes 
for abnormal behavior? What, indeed, when that diagnosis is grounded in the same 
conceptually instinctive foundation?  
 
Personal safety, most of us might in accord with this instinctive moral sense aver, should by 
itself be sufficient to vindicate compulsory commitment of psychiatrically ill persons. Tim 
Thornton, on the other hand, of the Institute for Philosophy, Diversity and Mental Health, 
University of Central Lancashire, United Kingdom, gives the impression that he is wholly 
unaware of any such likely consensus when he points out:  
 
Mental health care is the only area of medicine where fully conscious adult patients 
of normal intelligence can be treated against their will. Especially against a general 
increase in the emphasis on the rights and voices of patients or service users (or 
subjects), this aspect of mental health care calls for justification. Just what is it, if 
anything, about mental illness that can sometimes justify such coercive treatment? 
Given also that the values in play in mental health care seem to be more divergent 
than in other areas of physical medicine, how are value judgements [sic] best 
understood? (2007: 2-3)           
 
Thornton is incorrect on at least two counts: First, mental health is hardly “the only area of 
medicine” where adult patients can be treated mandatorily. Could it be that at the time he 
wrote these observations, Thornton had never heard that probably every nation in the world 
has established laws concerning the isolation and quarantine of physically, non-mentally ill 
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patients? Had he perfunctorily turned to, for example, the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention website, he would have read that “[i]solation and quarantine are public health 
practices used to stop or limit the spread of disease”; in fact, no less than “[t]wenty U.S. 
Quarantine Stations, located at ports of entry and land border crossings, use these public 
health practices” as a means to “limit the introduction of infectious diseases into the United 
States and to prevent their spread” http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine. 
 
Second, Thornton’s implicit point that compulsory admission of mental patients to state 
institutions requires a special type of justification becomes moot and superfluous in the light 
of our foregoing fact. Undoubtedly most of us would have met the opponents of coercive 
treatment with little more than nods of agreement had the typical psychiatrically ill person 
been someone who, let us imagine, routinely conversed with angels, cavorted with fairies 
and pixies, or followed moral advice he daily received from his neighbor’s dog — but, 
importantly, presented no danger to anyone. Most of us would have equally likely declared 
imposed treatment of even potentially dangerous individuals indefensible had they 
functioned in an environment wherein their behavior could in no wise threaten anyone’s 
welfare. On the other hand, in view of every society’s originary right and task to defend its 
residents in the best manner it knows how — or, as Cicero formulates the point in his 
Treatise on Laws, “Salus populi suprema lex esto” (Book III) — it appears indispensable 
that we promptly isolate and treat all individuals who because of their illnesses have 
revealed a tendency to harm their fellow citizens.  
 
Alas, self-evident social principles such as this must still be defended, if no longer from the 
moral superiority and wagging fingers of antipsychiatrists, then certainly from the 
liberalism and political correctness of the philosophers of psychiatry. Insofar as 
antipsychiatry has already taken its rightful place in the museum of intellectual oddities next 
to such exhibits of failed counter-theories as anti-relativism, and pseudo-scientific 
curiosities as orgone energy and phrenology, any endeavor nowadays to attenuate it still 
further would be redundant. Insofar, however, as we might assume just as antipathetic a 
stance toward philosophers of psychiatry who would pass themselves off as psychiatry’s 
moral guides, we might better grasp and analyze the elements of some of their defining         
claims by examining them through George Graham’s The Disordered Mind (second edition) 
as if through a magnifying glass. In what follows, then, I attempt to show that at least some 
of Graham’s more seminal inferences and assertions are resting on misleading or 
questionable considerations, though, granted, others might not have necessarily agreed with 
my selection of excerpts. To take into account as much of Graham’s discussion as we might 
within this text’s scope and medium, in each of the consecutively numbered blocks I, first, 
paraphrase several conceptually pregnant passages, and then present my analysis of each 
block immediately thereafter.  
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In the Preface to it, Graham writes that his book narrates two parallel “tales”: The first tale 
deals with “mental illness or disorder,” including “mental disorder’s reality, sources, [and] 
causes,” while the second “assumes that no sound and sensible philosophy of mind can be 
construed without attending to the topic of mental illness and to human vulnerability to 
mental illness.” Taken together, these “tales compose one story” (xiii). Graham might have 
brought his point into somewhat sharper focus had he said that his project is a synthesis of 
two related aims, namely, (i) to provide a mainly philosophical explanation of 
psychopathology instead of a neurological one, and (ii) insofar as they are impediments to 
our attaining the good life, to consider the nature and effects of mental disorders from an 
Aristotelian platform.  
 
My rephrasing of Graham’s intention is important, since a philosophical treatment of mental 
disorders not only implicitly appeals for a reduction in our reliance on drugs, but also shifts 
our understanding of mental disorders from a brain-based problem to a question of ethics 
and subjective assessments. Graham, in effect, affirms these points when he cautions us that 
although mental disorders might be rightly characterized as “impairments” of rationality, we 
need not necessarily take them as posts whereby we might demarcate the perimeters of 
basic human psychology. Not rationality, therefore, but the traits and dispositions which 
reinforce our ability to prosper as human beings, including making choices, intellectual and 
emotional commitment, and intentionality, should decide what is and what is not 
psychologically significant.  
 
1. To illustrate humankind’s intrinsic “vulnerability to instability or distress,” in the first 
part of his Chapter 1, Graham asks us to consider a “brief thought experiment”: Presuming 
we were, collectively speaking, Mother Nature, and, prior to humankind’s appearance, we 
wished to “build the sort of mind that will help us as human beings to engage with life on 
the planet” (2). Of the various ideas of the sort of mind we might build, let us narrow our 
choices to only two, “a stable and an unstable mind” (3). The stable mind is distinguished 
by order, “purity of heart and soundness of reason”; it is “free of regret and self-doubt”; it 
“never loses control of itself”; and it is “the object of single-minded dedication and 
intelligent direction.” Conversely, the unstable mind is disordered, and has “conflicting 
motives, impulses, and inhibitions as well as biases of thought and impediments to reason.” 
Neither does it “accept the negative consequences of its actions and frequently is conflicted 
or befuddled about just what is desirable.”  
 
Eventually, Graham writes, Mother Nature’s efforts brought forth a “mind that is both stable 
and unstable . . . orderly and disorderly, content and discontent, facing life’s vicissitudes but 
also seeking refuge from them.” Accordingly, while “the most unstable or discordant 
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individual is not without some small slice or sliver of stability,” even “the most stable is not 
without a shadow of instability” (3).    
         
Analysis:  Graham’s description of the human mind as Mother Nature’s synthesis of a 
stable part and an unstable part seems to be implying that both of them are equally good. 
After all, if Mother Nature herself saw the unstable part as important (and maybe even 
serviceable) enough to inextricably attach to the stable one, then might we not be 
misleading ourselves to reflexively prefer one to the other? Such a perspective, let us 
remember, is not without an historical precedent; indeed, in a multifaceted attempt to 
undermine the accepted primacy of the stable part, during the first half of the twentieth 
century — inspired by, inter alios, Edgar Allan Poe, Charles Baudelaire, and Georges 
Bataille — largely French associations of writers and artists, including Dadaists and 
Surrealists, went so far as to privilege nonsense and irrationality over reason and logic.  
 
Whether he intended to do so or not, Graham’s emphasis of the human mind as stable and 
unstable has effectively masked another, more significant fact, namely, that this is a 
decidedly uneven mixture — with the stable part consistently prevailing in any normal 
actor’s decision-making process and social interaction. This, in turn, draws our attention to 
the following observation Graham should have made: Insofar as she has everywhere 
circumscribed the unstable part’s influence over us, Mother Nature herself has expressed a 
preference for, and has predisposed us to desire and nurture, the stable part. As to the 
question of why, in that case, she has allowed the unstable part to exist at all, we could not 
but infer either (i) that Mother Nature must be an imperfect creator, or (ii) that, as explained 
by the pre-Socratic law of the unity of opposites, she has, for the purpose of change and 
contrast, willfully created every existent with its own counterpart. Since, irrespective of 
whether either or neither of these might be true, the unstable part promises to be with us for 
as long as we are around, we might relate to it as we normally relate to any somatic illness, 
as a condition that we would do well to reduce in frequency and intensity as much and as 
soon as possible.  
 
Our universal partiality for the stable part of the human mind is not, we must add, a mere 
preference, but an existential sine qua non. Devoid as human beings are of most of the 
instincts that have in certain ways made non-human existence easier, one need not be a 
sufferer or a Buddhist adherent to recognize human life as, in its full scope, a decidedly 
difficult experience. Relatively few of us are thus taken aback when, as Nietzsche quotes 
him in The Birth of Tragedy, we hear the wise Silenus deploring that the “greatest good” for 
humans would have been not to be born at all, to be nothing, while the second best, to die 
soon (Section 3). But if human life is difficult even now, the built-in ancillaries and 
accouterments of our social contexts created by our stable part notwithstanding, then life as 
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we know it would, surely, have been impossible within any social contexts created by our 
unstable part. Accordingly, instead of wondering what sort of mind we might have decided 
to put together, Graham would have proposed a better question had he inquired: Had we 
been better builders than Mother Nature, would we have decided to include so much as a 
whit of instability in that creation?  
 
2.  “When a person is mentally ill,” Graham observes in the latter half of Chapter 1, “there 
is necessarily something wrong or undesirable with their condition” (8). This, however, he 
cautions, should not be perfunctorily seen as indicating that the norms for mental illness 
must be neurological. To illustrate, let us imagine that “Alice’s grief and depression over 
the death of her husband and her disappointment with his adulterous behavior is so enduring 
and intense that she becomes a victim of insomnia, weight loss, and an inability to properly 
care for her children” (9). But her incapacity to curb these effects “does not mean that her 
brain is not functioning as it should relative to biological norms. She is not functioning well 
or as she should or wishes, to be sure, but her neural processes may be . . . in proper 
working order nonetheless” (8).  “Alice’s depression,” Graham proposes, “is best 
understood by deploying two general sorts of vocabularies or causal-explanatory languages 
. . . If Alice did not believe that her husband was dead or if she was not disappointed in his 
adulterous behavior, she would not be psychologically disturbed or upset” (9-10). In a word, 
Graham rejects the “broken brain conception of a mental disorder” as an adequate account 
of the problem, for “if a disorder is mental, then human psychology (and not just 
neurobiology and neurochemistry) is part of its causal explanatory foundations” (8).  
 
Describing himself as “tempted” to call his theory either the “twin theory” or “the truncated 
or impaired reason-responsiveness theory,” Graham decides that, “in the end,” he has “no 
name for it” (10). More importantly, he looks upon his book as promoting at least two “big” 
theses, namely, “a theory of mental disorder that does not relinquish the theory to, but 
deploys, brain science,” and “metaphysical realism about mental disorder.” Metaphysical 
realists, within whose ranks he includes himself, are those who believe that “mental 
disorders truly or objectively exist. They are real. By contrast: Those who assert that no 
condition of a person should ever be thought of as a mental disorder are mental disorder 
anti-realists. Mental disorders are not real. They don’t exist” (11-12).  
 
Analysis:  By referring to himself as a metaphysical realist concerning mental illness, 
Graham virtually ensures that no one would mistake him for an antipsychiatrist. At the same 
time, he perplexes us with his unlikely claim that Alice’s depression-caused incapacity to 
manage her various everyday activities “does not mean that her brain is not functioning as it 
should relative to biological norms. She is not functioning well . . . but her neural processes 
may be . . . in proper working order nonetheless.” Contingent upon how we interpret his 
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description, we might accept or reject Graham’s claim that Alice’s brain as still 
“functioning as it should relative to biological norms.” On the one hand, the brain’s 
structures discharge their biological duties even at the nadir of one’s depression: The 
hypothalamus continues to control its owner’s temperature and metabolic rate, the occipital 
lobes still interpret his or her visual sensory impulses, and the pituitary gland remains as the 
endocrine system’s director. On the other hand, Graham depicts Alice as suffering from a 
unipolar disorder, a condition which can cause actual (and by no means insignificant) 
constitutional, and corresponding behavioral, changes: Accordingly, if she went untreated 
for, say, several months, an eventual PET scan image would likely reveal not only a 
conspicuously decreased activity in her brain, but also a palpable shrinkage in its 
hippocampus and prefrontal cortex, an enlargement in its ventricles, and, still more, either 
an enlargement or a reduction in its corpus callosum. Alice’s neural processes, therefore, 
could be hardly thought of as being in “proper working order.”  
 
Even so, Graham’s averment that Alice’s depression might be best understood “by 
deploying two general sorts of vocabularies or causal-explanatory languages” appears to 
be on target. Psychotherapy sessions could not only contribute to our understanding of 
some of the antecedents of her depression, but also prove most effective in its treatment: 
Once we begin pharmacological treatment or, as a last resort, electroconvulsive therapy, 
cognitive therapy helps the patient to recognize negative or “catastrophic” opinions and 
to regain a sense of control and satisfaction in life by replacing them with more positive 
or constructive ones. Regaining such a sense is extremely significant, since well after 
remission of depression, some patients still (and frequently) report subterranean feelings 
of guilt, anger, and helplessness. From Graham’s angle, regaining that sense of control 
would fulfill a cardinal “criterion” in his understanding of what constitutes “the proper 
treatment of mental disorders,” which is to “help people to maintain or recover their 
dignity and self-respect” (14).  
 
3.  Graham’s discussion, in Chapter 2, of what is “mental about a mental disorder” (29) is, 
he points out, based on what “philosophy of mind says is the mental: states or conditions of 
persons (and of other creatures) that are conscious as well as states or conditions possessed 
of Intentionality.” Thus, while, say, a “brick is unaware of itself . . . all sorts of things 
(including us ourselves) appear to us persons in all sorts of different and distinct ways” (31). 
“Intentionality,” Graham writes, “if perhaps not as dramatically vivid as consciousness, is 
just as central to mindedness or to our being minded or having a perspective.” “The mind’s 
intentionality or aboutness is underived. It inheres in or is intrinsic to it” (33). In support of 
his insistence that consciousness and intentionality are crucial to grasping the role of the 
mental in mental disorder, Graham draws our attention to Jennifer Church who “in 
discussing the conscious Intentional states distinctive of depressed people, quotes a remark 
Essays Philos (2014)15:1                                                                                                         Jovanovski | 234 
 
 
 
of a forlorn character in a movie . . . Everything in the world, the character says, is getting 
‘meaner and grayer’ ” (33). Graham continues:  
               
An explanation of what it is like to be depressed, Church observes, ‘must take 
account of correspondence between what is . . . felt and what is . . . perceived’ (175). 
‘The felt qualities of [a] depressed state . . . are the perceived qualities of the objects 
around’ the depressed person (Church 2003: 176). Depression is the state; grayness 
and meanness appear in the world outside the depressed person. To feel depressed is 
(in part) to perceive the world as mean and gray. (34)    
   
At least two examples, the English novelist Virginia Woolf and Alice, the same character 
we have already met, Graham is convinced, should illuminate the veracity of these 
considerations. Woolf — who committed suicide by drowning while in the grips of a third 
depressive breakdown, during which she had begun to hear voices — according Graham, 
dedicated to a life defining goal, writing, “persists in intense and challenging efforts to 
achieve it, but simultaneously fears or believes that the likelihood of success is negligible or 
slim-to-none.” She might have thus felt “trapped or intractably stymied, helpless or 
impotent” (27). Alice, Graham thinks, is probably suffering from a similar sense of 
helplessness: “Why does she perceive herself to be helpless?” “Her grief and 
disappointment (in her husband’s behavior) may have strengthened her expectation of 
negative results for other commitments or behavior.” “It is, in particular, in attitudes of a 
self-referential or self-interpretive nature that people experience themselves as helpless or as 
personally overwhelmed and therein may become depressed” (42).  
 
So, to his own question, “how does mentality (Intentionality and consciousness) figure in 
mental disorder?” (35), Graham answers that in his opinion “mental disorders are produced 
by a mixture of mental and brute mechanical factors. In mental disorders both mentality and 
neurobiology/neurochemistry partially incapacitate or ‘gum up’ the operation of (basic 
faculties) mind and behavior” (43). “For example: Perhaps lowered serotonin does not as 
such cause depression directly or on its own, but permits hopeless attitudes and beliefs in 
one’s own helplessness to get stuck in a person’s stream of consciousness and to produce 
depression” (43).  
         
Analysis:  His consideration of mental disorder from a philosophical vantage point 
notwithstanding, Graham’s employment of Franz Brentano’s concept of Intentionality adds, 
I dare say, nothing of any practical value either to his immediate or to his general 
discussion; on the contrary, the concept appears to be at best superfluous, and at worst, 
confusing. In fact, the mental dispositions to which the term Intentionality refers could have 
been more effectively described by such terms as perception, or interpretation, or judgment: 
Essays Philos (2014)15:1                                                                                                         Jovanovski | 235 
 
 
 
To the extent that mental states like fears or hopes or beliefs are all about, or directed at, 
something, none of them could occur apart from the subject’s interpretation and judgment 
of the intentional object, and this irrespective of the latter’s ontological or existential status. 
Accordingly, while it might be true that, as Graham (à la Brentano and his Scholastic 
predecessors) maintains, Intentionality distinguishes mental from physical phenomena — 
insofar as each of the terms I have suggested equally performs the same function, he would 
have rendered his discussion much more accessible had he replaced Intentionality with any 
one of them.  
 
Instead, Graham intensifies our collective conceptual indigestion by presenting us with no 
more lucid a depiction of Intentionality when he claims that it “inheres in or is intrinsic” to 
the mind, than does Brentano when he writes, “Every mental phenomenon includes 
something as object within itself ” (1874/1995: 68). Since neither author really attempts to 
clearly explain this curious idea, we are left questioning whether they are: (i) advocating an 
immanentism of some sort, which would imply that the intentional object might be located 
inside the subject’s head, or (ii) claiming that if the intentional object is part of the mental 
act, then it must be, essentially, a sort of duplicate of the object. If so, whenever I think 
about my house, I am not actually thinking about the building itself, but about a part of my 
thinking act. Aside from these difficulties, it remains perplexing why, for as consequential a 
notion as Graham makes Intentionality seem, it is hardly so much as mentioned outside the 
several pages wherein it appears in Chapter 2.  
 
My claim that Graham’s employment of Brentano’s Intentionality might well have been 
replaced with either perception or interpretation without in the slightest redirecting or 
detracting from his discussion, appears to be implicitly supported by Graham himself when 
he approvingly formulates Church’s characterization of depression as, “To feel depressed is 
(in part) to perceive the world as mean and gray.” To be fair, however, we must concede 
that whether Graham ought or ought not to have made any such change is, ultimately, a 
question of lesser importance vis-à-vis (a) his treatment of depression as a monolithic 
phenomenon, and (b) the role he assigns to Intentionality qua perception as a partial cause 
of the helplessness he sees in Woolf ’s and in Alice’s respective behaviors.  
           
(a) As a clinical syndrome, depression might be described as a state of conscious psychic 
suffering, comprised of lowered mood-tone, frequently accompanied by feelings of guilt, 
with difficulty in reasoning, and diminution of psycho-motor and even organic activity. 
Grayness and feelings of emptiness and meaninglessness, therefore, do indeed prevail in 
practically every depressed individual’s social and physical contexts. The fact, however, 
that dejection might be superimposed upon any nosologic entity, which would render Woolf 
’s and Alice’s forms of depression similar in quality and severity, should in no respect 
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preclude or question attempts to distinguish between them thus: Insofar as at the time of her 
suicide Woolf was just beginning to experience auditory hallucinations, her depression 
would have to be appraised as the culmination of developing psychotic antecedents. On the 
other hand, insofar as Alice experienced no notable psychological hardships until her 
husband’s death and (subsequent) discovery of his marital infidelity, her depression would 
have to be evaluated as being of the neurotic sort. When, then, Graham writes that “[t]he 
symptoms of Woolf ’s particular disorder consisted, in part, of a complex set of conscious 
experiences of self and world” (27), he is, basically, referring to the symptoms of a 
psychiatric, or medical, illness, and not a disorder whose character is determined either by a 
faulty or by a catastrophic interpretation of reality.  
 
Of course, Woolf’s “complex set of conscious experiences of self and world” did, as 
Graham says, likely contribute to the increasing intensity of her illness in its incipient stage. 
Having conceded that, we might here rhetorically inquire: Precisely why ought we to regard 
Graham’s point as an informative observation, instead of a platitude? After all, what 
functioning individual’s psychological status has not been, in part, determined by such a 
“complex” of conscious experiences? To proceed further, however — let us grant that both 
Woolf and Alice could well be seen as feeling helpless, and that both could be effectively 
treated with the correct antidepressant medication. Having said that, we must insist that this 
is also the point beyond which these cases diverge. Specifically, whereas Woolf ’s 
depression is physiogenetic, which indicates that its origins could be traced to some 
impairment in her cerebral processes, Alice’s depression is clearly psychogenetic, which 
indicates that its origins could be traced to problems in her mental or emotional self, and not 
to any detectable somatic antecedents. In contrast to Woolf’s depression, that of Alice is, 
fundamentally, reactive, or a condition that is frequently caused by an important loss 
experienced by the depressed person, yet not accompanied by malignant symptoms like 
delusions, hallucinations, suicidal ruminations, or stupor.  
 
(b) Graham would have done better had he, in the light of Woolf ’s and Alice’s examples, 
not only distinguished between psychotic and neurotic forms of depression, but also 
emphasized the significance of each depressed person’s perception of his or her degree or 
intensity of helplessness. Such an emphasis is critical to understanding the decisions behind 
the existing spectrum of depression-precipitated behaviors. Such an emphasis is, proximal 
to Graham’s discussion, also critical to understanding our two — grosso modo diagnosed — 
characters’ strikingly different courses of action. While most degrees of depression can 
render even daily or routinely performed activities appear hollow, futile, Sisyphean, it is, 
principally, self-appraisals of complete helplessness that tend to compel fully functioning 
individuals to suspend their activities practically to the level of a hibernating animal. 
Though, in other words, it is true that most degrees of depression can variously deplete 
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one’s appetite for life, persons who tend to appraise themselves as only partly helpless 
remain quite capable of beginning and maintaining a specific plan or activity.  
 
To the extent that Woolf and Alice has each asserted her will by declining to seek 
psychiatric assistance, each of their individually reached decisions deserves to be looked 
upon as a considered, deliberate method of directly dealing with her perceived condition. 
Keeping in mind that she was, previously, repeatedly successfully treated by the British 
mental health system, we might characterize Woolf’s behavior as perhaps prematurely 
escapist. (In fact, more cynical individuals might espy other, not necessarily depression-
related factors in her decision to do away with herself.) Nevertheless, her behavior in the 
days preceding her final act, including her writing a suicide note and filling her pockets with 
stones just before walking into the River Ouse, shows that she was quite capable of at once 
lucid thought and initiative. Accordingly, we must infer that during that period, Woolf 
thought of herself as eventually becoming helpless, and not as being, in Graham’s dramatic 
description, “trapped or intractably stymied, helpless or impotent.”  
 
What, then, one might inquire, about Alice’s condition? Ought not we interpret her 
continuing languishment in bed as a reflection of her feeling, or of appraising herself as 
being, helpless? It is, indeed, possible, as Graham says, that in the wake of her husband’s 
infidelity and death, Alice’s “expectation of negative results for other commitments or 
behavior” has increased, and that she feels overwhelmed and stripped of initiative. Yet, we 
could not, on the basis of the available evidence, advance such a point with complete 
confidence; for insofar as Graham reveals no information concerning any previous bouts 
with depression she might have experienced, his description of the case must be seen as 
incomplete. In fact, that information could be used as a standard against which we might 
determine whether Alice tends to respond to emotional situations with depressive, but only 
temporary, inactivity. Even if we discovered that this is her first helpless reaction, we could 
still not infer whether this will turn out to be a long-lasting state or a grieving but, again, 
only temporary process that any normal person would go through when faced with a similar 
circumstance. In a word, we could no less validly maintain that Alice has appraised her 
condition as something she simply has to live through than does Graham when he claims 
that she perceives herself as helpless.  
 
From Graham’s angle, Woolf and Alice would have to be diagnosed as suffering from a 
mental disorder, since their respective mixtures of “mental and brute mechanical factors,” 
that is, their “mentality and neurobiology/neurochemistry partially incapacitate or ‘gum up’ 
the operation of (basic faculties) mind and behavior.” This explanation of mental illness 
sounds plausible indeed, which would indicate that, in order to thrive and prosper again, 
Alice should some day begin to seek psychological as well as psychiatric help. As we have 
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seen, however, Graham wishes to ascribe virtually as much causative influence to mentality 
as he does to neurobiology and neurochemistry. When he observes that perhaps lowered 
amounts of serotonin do not in and of themselves cause depression, but permit hopeless 
beliefs to “get stuck in a person’s stream of consciousness,” he is implying that treating the 
depressed individual psychotherapeutically should produce no less success than if he or she 
were treated pharmacologically. But this is hardly ever the case, since while a depressed 
person may or may not at all get better with psychotherapy, he or she rarely if ever fails to 
get better with pharmacological therapy. The same results would occur had we discovered 
that nothing but hopeless beliefs cause the lowering of serotonin levels in the brain, as 
seems likely in Alice’s case. My point could be phrased as something of a mental health 
theorem thus: More disorders meet with more success when they are treated psychiatrically 
than when they are treated psychotherapeutically.  
            
4.  Near the end of his book’s Chapter 4, Graham turns to a defining concern of his, “the 
respect-for-persons argument,” whose spirit he repeatedly and variously formulates thus: 
“Characterizing a person as the subject of a mental disorder is a form of disrespect or an 
indignity to them as a person” (93). To put this unease of his into focus, Graham proposes 
“something hypothetical and imaginary”: Suppose a psychiatrist discovers that some 
university students are so “dramatically and unhappily concerned with grades” that they 
engage not only in such a “needlessly redundant activity” as “repeating class note reviews 
on too numerous occasions,” but also in “imprudent and reckless behavior” like “pulling 
‘all-nighters’ which cause sleep deprived students to do poorly on tests and to risk somatic 
ill-health.” The same psychiatrist’s research has, moreover, determined that the students’ 
“states of grade anxiety are accompanied by statistically abnormal activity in the verbally 
dominant left hemisphere of the brain.” Suppose, Graham’s illustration continues, our 
psychiatrist has managed to become a part of the “team composing the DSM-5 and argues 
that disturbances and behaviors distinctive of grade hyper-concern deserve their own 
classificatory status in DSM-5.” This discovery, the psychiatrist urges, might be included in 
the DSM as a “special sort of disorder” under the name of “Grade Obsessive Disorder,” or 
GOD (93).  
 
At least one argument that could be mounted against the inclusion of GOD as a disorder, 
Graham proposes, is his “Respect for Persons Criticism.” In the light of this “Criticism,” 
unlike, for example, dogs, which frequently must be trained not to chew on rugs, “people 
should be treated as capable of being reasoned with about their conduct” (94). Thus, “[i]f a 
person were, say, to obsessively chew on a rug, we should not aim to train them. We should 
help them to modify their own behavior and to become better at reasoning about how to 
behave.” And rightly so, Graham holds, to the extent that some “people have unusual 
preferences, unshared by others, or imprudent desires, harmful to themselves (wishing to 
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chew on rugs, for example). But an unusual or imprudent desire just is another desire or 
preference. There is no good reason for believing that it needs to be ‘cured’ by classifying a 
person as mentally ill” (94). Labeling anyone as “disordered also allows psychiatrists and 
other mental health professionals to assume a position of unwarranted judgmental 
authority.” “In brief,” therefore, Graham concludes, “labeling and involuntary treatment is 
morally inconsistent with human dignity, with respect for persons” (95).  
 
Analysis:  As if their anachronistic tenor were not perplexing enough, Graham’s remarks in 
this section seem overwrought and self-contradictory. It is certainly true that the students in 
his GOD example must not be, as he says, compelled by anyone into any sort of therapy. 
But, indeed, we might inquire with a reflexively pronounced grimace of incredulity, how 
many individuals who merely behave in ritualistic ways, are nowadays — or were even a 
century ago — exposed to unwelcome treatment? Nor, if requested to do so, would he, I 
dare say, be able to name any. As well intentioned, then, as this part of his discussion might 
be, Graham, let us concede, is no more insightful or absorbing than anyone who would 
seriously set out to prove that labeling people ugly and performing involuntary cosmetic 
plastic surgery to improve their appearance is “morally inconsistent with human dignity.” In 
a word, we need be no more concerned with the incidence of involuntary treatment of 
obsessive-compulsive individuals than we should be about ugly individuals being given 
forcible plastic surgery.  
 
Besides, it is unlikely that many would see the GOD students’ obsessive reviewing and 
compulsive reshuffling of their notes as any real disorder; on the contrary, probably most of 
us would conclude that they are either plodders, who must persevere in order to successfully 
complete a task, or conscientious future professionals, who in the face of persistently rising 
college tuitions and a shrinking job market have no choice but to excel in their academic 
studies. Before diagnosing them as obsessive-compulsive, therefore, Graham’s psychiatrist 
ought to, first, establish whether the statistically abnormal activity in the students’ left 
hemisphere of the brain is the cause or the result of their scholastic travails: If the 
abnormality is the cause, then further research should be recommended to determine 
whether, besides neurological, this is an inherent and possibly lethal anomaly; if, on the 
other hand, the abnormality is the result, then still further research would have to be done to 
determine whether the abnormality is a transitory or a life-long, and lethal, condition. 
Whether one or the other, then, the abnormality in question sounds like a more serious 
neurological condition than Graham’s description seems to convey.  
 
Individuals who have been correctly evaluated as obsessive-compulsive are widely 
perceived as abnormal and as behaving unusually — because they are, and because they do. 
So, it is surprising that as a self-proclaimed metaphysical realist, or one who believes that 
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“mental disorders truly or objectively exist,” Graham has decided not to recognize the 
behaviors he does describe, apart from the GOD students’ endeavors, as disordered. In fact, 
his antipsychiatric assertion that any behavior — yes, even chewing on rugs — however 
“unusual or imprudent” it might be, is just “another desire or preference,” and therefore 
requires no “cure,” is patently misleading. His petitio principii-based fear that any clinical 
diagnosis practically invariably translates into a human dignity violation is the sort of 
straitjacketing claim that only an antipsychiatrist would hold dear. Let us be clear here: 
When characterizing someone as being in the grips of a disorder, most of us have no wish 
either to insult or — as Graham approvingly quotes Foucault (95) — to “judge” for the 
purpose of removing him or her from society, but (i) to communicate the existence of a 
difficult, simultaneously fruitless and uncomfortable condition, and (ii) to imply that, if 
asked to do so, we might provide assistance to the individual in question.  
 
Would we, as a society, really detract from an obsessed individual’s dignity if we informed 
him or her that his or her condition could be alleviated with cognitive therapy or with 
antidepressants, just in case he or she decided to take advantage of those options? On the 
contrary, we would be not only shirking our salus populi responsibility, but also detracting 
from that individual’s dignity if we did not familiarize him or her with those options; if 
anything, we would be implicitly pointing to that citizen as being of lesser importance in 
contrast to those who have been helped by those options.  
 
The foregoing consideration brings us to still another problem, this one precipitated by 
Graham’s concern that diagnosis is cultural and legal destiny: When he proposes that if one 
were obsessively chewing on a rug, “we should not aim to train them,” but only “help them 
to modify their own behavior and to become better at reasoning about how to behave,” he, 
conveniently, declines to inform us how we might go about doing that. How, indeed, would 
we or Graham “reason” with someone who neither asks for assistance nor considers his or 
her behavior as extraordinary, let alone bizarre? Even if Graham were to no more than 
modify that sort of behavior, would Graham not have to, first, acknowledge and inform the 
actor that he or she is indeed in the grips of a disorder, and by doing so unavoidably insult 
his or her dignity? Still more, why would Graham attempt to reason with the actor if, by his 
own reckoning, even the most “unusual or imprudent desire just is another desire or 
preference”? To the extent that Graham wishes people to prosper, he would have no choice 
but (i) to impress upon the actor that his or her behavior is of the sort that tends to diminish 
the natural quality of human life, and that (ii) he or she is in need of assistance whether he 
or she knows it or not. He would have no choice but to (gently, I suppose, yet firmly) 
propose that chewing on rugs or engaging in coprophagia and necrophilia could not rightly 
be thought of as mere desires and preferences, but as behaviors that are potentially 
dangerous to the actor’s own existence and unquestionably noxious to social life at large.  
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The sort of lumbering conceptual gymnastics that Graham has shown us here may be 
encountered in other sections of his book. Limited in scope as it is, my analysis of at least 
some of his claims never either aimed at or succeeded in refuting his rather lengthy 
treatment of the character and social and legal difficulties that attach to mental disorders. 
My hope is that I have at least drawn attention to some of the questionable claims and 
inferences in The Disordered Mind, and, by extension, to the philosophy of psychiatry. As 
for the latter, if Graham and Thornton and Radden correctly reflect its letter and spirit, then 
we might, in contrast to the advocates of antipsychiatry, think of the philosophers of 
psychiatry as a growing chorus of not only younger, but also somewhat softer voices — yet 
a chorus singing a nevertheless old, not to say banal, tune.  
 
Moreover, in the light of the scholarship’s invariably challenging attitude, a large part of 
which remains firmly footed in antipsychiatry, the danger is not insignificant that some of 
its (especially emerging) contributors would glom onto its defining theses, and — as tend to 
do most of those who have not independently derived an idea — without much critical 
analysis advance them as truisms. We have already emphasized that these theses are at least 
partly true, as, for example, that stigma attached to the mentally ill is a historical fact; that 
the role of values in the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders has been frequently 
ignored or misunderstood; and that the cultural and political power psychiatry has wielded 
since virtually its inception has been consistently greater than its partly unscientific precepts 
would merit. At the same time, some of these concerns are not what they might appear to be 
at first blush: It is, for one, no longer as persuasive to claim that the stigma which attached 
to the insane decades ago is just as intense today; indeed, anyone who would still challenge 
psychiatry on that point is merely mounting a straw man argument.  
 
As the philosophy of psychiatry grows, it is my hope that its advocates will exhibit restraint 
in their critical analysis of psychiatry. While it is true that in the past, and today, mental 
health workers have occasionally and for various reasons caused a “black eye” to both 
clinical psychology and psychiatry, their behavior should not be emphasized as any more of 
a sufficient reason to censure these fields qua professions, than would, let us say, 
malpractice by doctors and by nurses be sufficient of a reason to question or restrict the 
medical profession as a whole. To do so would cast doubt not only upon its practitioners, 
but also upon what serviceable knowledge we have accumulated about psychopathology. In 
a word, to cast psychiatry in a questionable light would be to deflect not only the social, but 
also the personal benefits of its treatment.  
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